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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Amicus Professor Eric Goldman is Associate Dean for Research,
Professor of Law, co-director of the High Tech Law Institute, and supervisor of
the Privacy Law Certificate at Santa Clara University School of Law in
California. His research and teaching focuses on Internet Law, especially usergenerated content, and he has published dozens of papers on this topic in the
past quarter-century. He first started practicing Internet Law in 1994 and has
taught an Internet Law course since 1996. He is an elected member of the
American Law Institute.
Professor Goldman submits this brief to explain why, based on his
nearly 30 years of research into online speech, Texas House Bill 20’s (“HB 20”)
transparency requirements pose significant risks to user-generated content
and free speech online.
INTRODUCTION
Although HB 20’s transparency requirements may superficially appear
less obviously unconstitutional compared to other parts of HB 20, this brief
explains why the “transparency” provisions of HB 20, standing alone, violate
the First Amendment and must be enjoined alongside the bill’s other
provisions.
Legislatures do not require traditional publishers, such as newspapers
or book publishers, to disclose details about their editorial operations and
decisions.

For example, no laws require book publishers to explain to

prospective authors why they rejected certain manuscripts or newspapers to
1

disclose statistics about how many letters to the editor and op-eds they
received and chose not to publish. Indeed, any such legislative mandates
would undoubtedly violate the First Amendment’s protections of speech and
press freedoms.
Yet, Texas enacted a “social media censorship” law called HB 20, with
the completely unprecedented requirement that online publishers1 make
disclosures about their editorial operations and policies that no offline
publishers have been required to make—or could be required to make.2 These
disclosures are qualitatively different from other types of constitutionally
permissible commercial disclosure requirements because they will affect online
publishers’ editorial decisions.

These mandates also carry discovery

implications that will further distort online publishers’ editorial decisions by
entangling the government into every aspect of the publishers’ editorial
operations. Such inevitable distortions of publishers’ editorial decisions and
operations are intolerable under the First Amendment.
For that reason, this Court should grant the emergency application for

The law applies to “social media platforms” that meet specified criteria, but
the essential statutory requirement of the regulated entities is that they
gather, organize, and disseminate third-party content. In other words, they
function as publishers of third-party content online. The brief refers to the
regulated entities as publishers, rather than “social media platforms,” to
ensure this essential point is not lost.
2 In Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the Court held that precedent provided
“no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be
applied to the Internet.” Id. at 870. As a result, the First Amendment applies
to online and offline publishers equally.
1
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administrative relief and vacate the Fifth Circuit’s stay of the district court’s
preliminary injunction.
BACKGROUND
HB 20 compels online publishers to make three types of disclosures:
(1) editorial policies, (2) explanations of editorial decisions, and (3) statistics
about editorial decisions.
Editorial Policies. HB 20 requires publishers to publish “acceptable
use policies,” i.e., to codify and disclose all of their editorial policies. Tex. Bus.
& Com. Code § 120.052. HB 20 also requires that publishers “publicly disclose
accurate

information

regarding

[their]

content

management,

data

management, and business practices.” Id. § 120.051(a). This requirement
demands “specific information regarding the manner in which the social media
platform”:
(1) curates and targets content to users;
(2) places and promotes content, services, and products, including its
own content, services, and products;
(3) moderates content;
(4) uses search, ranking, or other algorithms or procedures that
determine results on the platform; and
(5) provides users’ performance data on the use of the platform and its
products and services.
Id. § 120.051(a)(1)-(5). The law requires that these disclosures “be sufficient
to enable users to make an informed choice regarding the purchase of or use of
access to or services from the platform,” id. § 120.051(b), though it is unclear
what disclosures will satisfy this requirement.
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Explanations. The law requires publishers to explain their decisions
to users affected by their editorial policies. Id. § 120.103(a)(1). Publishers
must notify any user whose content is removed due to its editorial decision and
“explain the reason the content was removed.” Id. If the publisher reverses
its decision to remove a user’s content after the user’s appeal, it must further
explain the reversal. Id. § 120.103(a)(3).
Statistics. HB 20 mandates that publishers release biannual reports
containing an extensive list of statistics, such as the total number of instances
when the publisher was alerted to and took action against illegal content. Id.
§ 120.053.
ARGUMENT
I.

HB 20’s mandatory editorial transparency requirements
violate the First Amendment
This Court helpfully analyzed the constitutionality of mandatory

editorial disclosures in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). There, the
plaintiff, a public figure, sued a television show for defamation, and the
defendants responded that they did not act with actual malice. Id. at 156. To
assess the actual malice defense, the plaintiff propounded discovery requests
seeking details about the show’s decision to publish the alleged defamation.
Id. at 157. The defendants declined to answer. Id.
The Court ordered the requested discovery, with numerous caveats.
First, the plaintiff’s discovery request arose in the context of a defamation
litigation, so it was appropriate to investigate the defendant’s scienter about
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the alleged falsity. The Court cautioned, however, that “if inquiry into editorial
conclusions threatens the suppression . . . of truthful information, the issue
would be quite different.” Id. at 172. Second, because only a small fraction of
a publisher’s editorial decisions trigger defamation lawsuits, the Court said
that discovery into editorial decisions should be rare, not commonplace—i.e.,
“in the tiny percentage of instances in which error is claimed and litigation
ensues.” Id. at 174. Third, the discovery disclosures would be supervised by
judges who would be required to “firmly appl[y]” the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure’s relevancy requirements. Id. at 177. Fourth, the Court emphasized
that “[t]here is no law that subjects the editorial process to private or official
examination merely to satisfy curiosity or to serve some general end such as
the public interest; and if there were, it would not survive constitutional
scrutiny as the First Amendment is presently construed.” Id. at 174.
In contrast to discovery into a defamation defendant’s state of mind, HB
20’s disclosure requirements are exactly the kind of mandatory disclosures
that the Herbert court said would be unconstitutional. Unlike in Herbert, HB
20 does not apply only to the “tiny percentage” of cases where defendants are
accused of making tortious false statements.

Instead, HB 20 requires

explanations of potentially hundreds of millions, if not billions, of editorial
decisions—each day—including decisions where the publisher violated no law
and committed no tort. Furthermore, unlike the kind of tailored disclosures
contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, HB 20’s disclosure
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requirements are categorical, broad-based, and burdensome—requiring
disclosures ranging from an Internet service’s editorial policies to proprietary
statistics on editorial decisions. And no judge supervises the need for specific
disclosures or their relevancy to any legal dispute.
In sum, HB 20 requires disclosures about core editorial activities
without any showing of a prima facie case of a legal violation, without any
plaintiffs justifying their need for discovery, and without any judicial oversight
of the disclosure’s necessity or appropriateness. While Texas justifies HB 20’s
onerous invasion into editorial decision-making on the ground that “social
media platforms . . . are affected with a public interest,” 2021 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 2d Called Sess. Ch. 3, § 1(3) (West), that justification highlights that, in
contrast to Herbert’s provisions, Texas is mandating the disclosures “to satisfy
curiosity or to serve some general end such as the public interest.” Herbert,
441 U.S. at 174.

That is exactly what this Court concluded the First

Amendment did not permit.
II.

HB 20’s editorial transparency requirements are not like
disclosure requirements in other commercial contexts
Although HB 20 may look on its face like a standard commercial

disclosure law that can be found throughout our economy, the law is quite
different in ways that undermine its constitutionality. Standard commercial
disclosure laws regulate the provision of goods and services, while HB 20
regulates the provision of speech.

If a general disclosure law prompts a

company to change its commercial offerings, the product or service changes do
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not change constitutionally protected speech. For example, if a food-labeling
law causes a manufacturer to modify the amount of saturated fat in its product,
that product change does not infringe on the manufacturer’s freedom of speech.
In contrast, if a mandatory editorial transparency law causes a publisher to
change its publication decisions, then the law implicates the publisher’s
freedom of speech and press.

As discussed in the next part, HB 20 will

undoubtedly cause online publishers to change their speech decisions.
Standard commercial disclosure laws are also distinguishable in that
government regulators can investigate the accuracy of the disclosures without
reviewing any editorial decisions. For example, regulators can validate the
accuracy of a publisher’s securities filing without investigating the publisher’s
editorial decision-making process. See S.E.C. v. McGoff, 647 F.2d 185, 190
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (government subpoena could not reach materials related to
“editorial policy”). In contrast, the government can confirm the accuracy of HB
20’s mandatory editorial disclosures only by actually investigating the
publishers’ editorial decisions (to see if they were accurately reported or
described).
Finally, editorial transparency economically distorts publishers’
editorial decisions.

As the Fourth Circuit explained in striking down a

Maryland campaign finance disclosure law regulating online publishers,
“platform-based campaign finance regulations . . . make it financially irrational
. . . for platforms to carry political speech when other, more profitable options
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are available.” Washington Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 516 (4th Cir.
2019). Thus, campaign finance disclosures may permissibly regulate the firstparty speakers (the donors or recipients)—but extending those disclosure
requirements to publishers of third-party content creates a financial deterrent
to publishing the content at all.
In addition, “platform-based campaign finance regulations create
freestanding legal liabilities and compliance burdens that independently deter
hosting political speech.” Id. As the Fourth Circuit observed, compliance with
just the simplest portion of Maryland’s campaign finance disclosure law would
force publishers “to acquire new software for data collection; publish additional
web pages; and disclose proprietary pricing models.” Id. The court concluded:
“Faced with this headache, there is good reason to suspect many platforms
would simply conclude: Why bother?”

Id.

When governments impose

mandatory disclosures on publishers of third-party content, it impermissibly
inhibits the publishers’ willingness to publish that third-party speech.
III.

HB 20’s disclosure requirements are impermissibly
invasive
Though not explicit in HB 20’s text, the law’s mandatory transparency

requirements implicitly require publishers to make their records available to
government investigators and plaintiffs so that the disclosures’ accuracy may
be confirmed. This inspection process further distorts publishers’ editorial
decisions. Granting an inspection right to regulators “brings the state into an
unhealthy entanglement with news outlets” because this inspection right
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“lacks any readily discernable limits on the ability of government to supervise
the operations of the newsroom.” Id. at 518-19. And “[w]ithout clear limits,
the specter of a broad inspection authority, coupled with an expanded
disclosure obligation, can chill speech and is a form of state power the Supreme
Court would not countenance.” Id. at 519.
What are those “unhealthy entanglements”? Government inspection
puts the government in the role of second-guessing every publisher decision.
Knowing this is coming, publishers make their editorial decisions to reduce the
risk of costly, disruptive, and legally risky investigations or enforcement
actions. In other words, rather than making the decisions it considers the best
for its audience, the publisher makes editorial decisions to please regulators
and keep them at bay.

This substitution of editorial judgment, from the

publisher’s judgment to the regulator, is exactly what the First Amendment
prohibits.
In Herbert, this Court tolerated the risk of judicial intrusion into
editorial decisions only because it would lead to less publication of
unconstitutional content such as defamatory material. By contrast, HB 20’s
categorical and indiscriminate disclosure obligations reach the editorial
decision-making processes for constitutionally protected content, not just
unprotected content—an impermissible outcome under Herbert.
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CONCLUSION
HB 20’s mandatory editorial transparency requirements constitute an
unprecedented effort to censor publishers that the First Amendment does not
permit at this (or any) stage of the dispute. This Court should grant the
emergency application for administrative relief and vacate the Fifth Circuit’s
stay of the district court’s preliminary injunction.
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